Speech by Alyson Bailes at LATO office, Riga, 26 April 2001

SPEAKING NOTES

Introduction

- Greek myth of “Europa” - helpless maiden riding on a bull (and presumably ravished by it).Image of Europe as soft, helpless, feminine …..

- Not surprising if this is the subconscious image for many of us in this century: (i) balance and freedom of Europe only restored by US intervention at end of two world wars, (ii) division into superpower blocs in Cold War, (iii) today’s situation with US as sole superpower and democratic Europe still determined to maintain Atlantic Alliance.

- Taking slightly longer historical perspective, could identify three ways in which Europe’s peace and welfare has been threatened:

(a) conflicts among its own large powers

(b) power vacuum in Eastern Europe between large Western powers and Russia, leading either to conflict between them or to carve-up of the lands in between

(c) invasion from the South-East - Mongols, Hungarians, Ottoman Turks.

Of these, the third was dealt with by the Europeans themselves but hasn’t recurred since the 17^th century. The first two have dominated modern times and have only been overcome this century with US (ie outside) help. No wonder we are stuck with the image of Europe “producing more history than it can consume”.

- My aim tonight is to try to challenge the simplicity of this picture: to suggest that we may have gone too far in our assumption of Euro-helplessness, which is in turn one of the main contributors to Euro-pessimism.

- But in so doing let me make clear at once (and will come back to this later) that I am not setting out to challenge either the need for or desirability of strategic cooperation with North America.  On the contrary I shall argue that by asserting its own strength more realistically and taking the full responsibility it is capable of taking, Europe has the best chance of retaining the respect and interest of our American friends and of creating a more balanced and durable trans-Atlantic partnership.

Updating the Threat

First step to more balanced analysis is to point out that Europe does change and history doesn’t necessarily repeat itself.  Threat pattern fundamentally changed by two radical new inventions of post-War times: collective defence and European integration, as enshrined in NATO and the EU respectively: -

- the combination of both of these as embodied in NATO and EU has eliminated the risk of old-fashioned national conflict among West European powers: NATO members can neither leave each other in the lurch, nor attack each other (even Greece and Turkey!); EU members would find it both suicidal and practically impossible to go to war among themselves because of their interdependence (original vision of Monnet and Schumann)

- NATO’s steadfastness and effective deterrence in Cold War preserved W Europe from attack from East and helped to create conditions for collapse of Soviet occupation and Empire in 1989-90, so that even Russia now professes “Western” aims and values.

So what is left in the way of threats?

1. Cold-War type risk of attack from East reduced almost but not quite to zero.  Still justified to worry about grey areas of security in Central/Eastern Europe if the Soviet power now withdrawn is not replaced by enduring regional cooperation and spread of Western-style integration, combined with vigorous and viable local regimes. In present times, important to note that degradation of conditions in this part of Europe could flow both from Russian strength (if reasserted in aggressive way) and from Russian weakness (overflow of chaotic conditions from the East).

2. However, more immediate threat has come from other region where collapse of Cold War disciplines opened way for breakdown of earlier State structure and regional balance ie Former Yugoslavia. Note important differences from history: conflict has remained regional, tightly contained, and since the Serb/Croatian armistice has been intra- rather than inter-State: has not triggered rivalries and more general conflict among big Western powers; has seen Russian peacekeepers working on same side as NATO ones. But still a painful challenge to other Europeans (i) morally and psychologically, (ii) through non-military overspill eg refugeeism, impact on trade, (iii) through demand for military and other intervention.

3. Non-military overspill from this particular conflict highlights more general vulnerability of civilised Europe to “new threats” which hit citizens rather than governments (and usually ignore frontiers). Opinion polls in W Europe suggest these are in fact at forefront of citizens’ attention and of their demands for protection from their governments: breakdown of law and order, resort to violence and/or oppression of particular groups within society, proliferation of WMD and the risk of accidents involving these weapons, human and animal disease and food contamination, the drug trade, international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation and climate change, interruption of energy supplies and exhaustion of natural resources, illegal and uncontrolled migration, etc etc

4. Finally, some would say the old theme of attack from South or South-East might be revived in new age by pressure of large populations in N Africa, Middle East and West Asia: aggravated by local phenomena of extremism, dysfunctional States or “rogue State” behaviour and unsolved local conflicts: and made more worrying by our still-high dependence on the Arab world for energy resources. In near-medium future, such risk best defined in terms not of outright attack on West but possible terrorism, misuse of WMD (proliferation problem), and overspill of conflicts not initially aimed at us (interruption of energy supplies, hostage taking, refugees etc)..

Europe’s Share: (i) in NATO

The question is therefore: what part does Europe have in protecting itself from these various threats? Can it manage any of them alone and if not what partners does it need, and what effort can and should it make to justify their help?

NATO still clearly has to be part of the solution, (a) insofar as traditional guarantees and deterrence are still needed (certainly premature to abandon them now, and non-members as well as members are still grateful for the cover NATO’s presence gives to Europe as a whole): and (b) for the tougher kind of peacemaking and peacekeeping as witnessed in Former Yugoslavia. (Not just a question of being able to use US military resources and the power of NATO’s military structures and shared assets: a trans-Atlantic common political front also crucial for dealing with toughest adversaries. Also, easier to bring Russia into crisis management coalitions in a balanced and controlled way if US is part of the equation.) But NATO has also been active (c) in extending the pattern of peaceful cooperation across post-CW Europe both through direct enlargement and by means of PfP, EAPC and regional circles within the latter: thus helping to suppress old rivalries, reduce clientism, pre-empt possible crises and prevent strategic vacuums.  Last but not least: going back to NATO’s historical role as a anti-nationalist device, it still offers the only group where a nation can pledge itself totally to collective defence with its neighbours, thus giving up the aggressive as well as the neutralist path: a country that feels it important to do this may thus feel compelled to seek Alliance membership even in the absence of any obvious threat.

Clearly, a special and unique value is given to all these roles and manifestations of NATO by the presence of the N. American Allies. But the Europeans are the very opposite of free riders in NATO – it wouldn’t last long if they were! Even the concept of the Article 5 guarantee was borrowed by the Washington Treaty from the Brussels Treaty which created a defence union of Britain/France/Benelux. All classic NATO policies (forward defence, Harmel Report, flexible response) had strong European inspiration. Though US nuclear power vital for deterrence, the chain of credibility was completed by existence of British and French nuclear capability under independent national control.

Since 1980’s, esp. strong interest in developing “European pillar” of NATO for more effective burden-sharing, coupled with recognition that Europeans can’t develop their input fully (either forces, armaments or concepts) unless they are allowed some freedom to discuss these matters separately among themselves – not behind the US’s back or against the US, but in the interests of presenting themselves to the US as more coherent and effective partners. Hence line of “European defence” evolution which goes through Eurogroup, WEU revival of mid-1980s, redesign of European command structure (70% of posts held by Europeans, role of Deputy SACEUR), invention of CJTFs in 1994, Berlin agenda of 1996 inc. NATO/WEU collaboration to develop dual-use “separable but not separate” forces: and finally from autumn 1998 onwards, new “St Malo” initiative for EU itself to create a capacity for mounting European-led crisis management operations – which means the EU itself entering direct cooperation and partnership with NATO (WEU “middle-man” eliminated).

Results up to now:

- European members of NATO have total of 2.2 million personnel under arms: 60% of NATO’s overall manpower;

- This accounts for 95% of the NATO forces permanently stationed in Europe;

- Of all defence spending by NATO nations, Europeans’ spending accounts for some 40%;

- European nations also have some of highest ratios of spending on equipment as proportion of defence budget (NATO average in 2001 is 17.10%, EU average would be 18.64%);

- (Partly as a result of new efforts since St Malo) only 6 of the 20 Europeans in NATO and EU still have a declining trend in defence expenditure this year and 2 of those intend to correct it next year;

- 15,500 of NATO’s 20,000 forces in Bosnia are European, and 32,400 of the 37,000 in Kosovo.

For all this, Europeans in NATO still accept that their performance is insufficient: in particular, that they are lacking in certain assets needed for rapid reaction and medium-to-tough crisis management, and that they face a widening technology gap from the US notably in hi-tech intensive combat and C3I. The NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative has set them new targets to try to overcome this, and at the same time the EU’s Headline Goal (Helsinki European Council Dec 1999) requires political pledges from them to prepare specific high-standard inputs (both men and assets) to a possible EU crisis management force. These two sets of demands will be coordinated, to act like pincers on individual governments. Already signs of impact in individual national decisions (changes in defence structures/conscription, new collaboration programmes, resource-sharing and limited specialisation …).

Interim lessons to draw: NATO couldn’t defend Europeans against the top end of the threat spectrum as set out above if it wasn’t for the strength of the Europeans’ own contribution, and their manifest will to continue and improve it. NATO’s viability rests on this European input in at least 3 senses: (1) the purely practical, (2) the need for adequate European effort to persuade the Americans to keep contributing (”burden-sharing”), (3) the need for Europeans to pay their way if they wish to have proper influence over the US and in NATO decision-making - which in turn is crucial for the Alliance’s balance and solidarity. Second, what the above story means for the individual European nation is that this is a doubly expensive time to belong to or to join NATO. It’s expensive in material terms because the “peace dividend” has been reversed, an especially high and improving level of performance is demanded from European members, and the controls to ensure it’s given are doubly tight on those countries which are also monitored through the EU. Furthermore, membership is expensive in political terms because not only do members have to give up national aggression, isolationism or neutrality, they also have to work to support NATO’s extended security-building structure in PfP/EAPC, they have to help NATO find positive solutions to the conundrum of constructive cooperation and joint crisis management with Russia, and (not least) they have to play a part in the very sensitive politics of trans-Atlantic issues like NMD where potential US/European differences have to be solved for the sake of keeping the Alliance intact.

Europe’s Share: (ii) The EU

But all this so far has only covered the top bit of the threat spectrum - not even the whole of the crisis management item: because however crucial NATO’s role may be in deterring, containing or ending crises, its competences and resources are not designed for tackling their inner causes or for healing/rebuilding the dysfunctional States and societies which give rise to them. Nor does NATO attempt to tackle any of the list of new threats given before, except for its still-emerging policies again proliferation (and certain other arms control contributions). Nor does it see its role as to counter threats from Africa or Middle East - though it does have a positive programme for Mediterranean cooperation, designed to foster dialogue and reduce tension so far as possible between the Northern and Southern coasts.

Short answer is that the rest of the spectrum is not adequately covered at the moment and is the area of all areas where Europe needs to try harder. But to the extent that any single institution tries to cope with it, it is the EU. Consider the range of ways in which the Europeans contribute to their own security n the wider sense:

(a) The original role of the EU as a war-preventing organisation within Western Europe: NB positive (if largely indirect) impact also on remaining conflicts like N. Ireland, Basques. The new EU style of integration both blocks aggression through interdependence, and takes away or sublimates the sources of traditional ethnic/religious conflict by means of open borders, free movement, identical basic rights guaranteed across the territory, and universal institutions for representation/democratic control/judicial challenge. No better way yet found to solve Yugoslav-type problems, hence logical that EU accepted in 1998-9 the need to offer all Balkan partners a prospect of membership however remote - both as incentive and as model for change ……

(b) Security value of other internal EU policies eg for controlling and cushioning social/sectoral change, reducing income disparities within and between States, developing common economic remedies for challenges like ageing populations: internal aspects of JHA agenda (crime-fighting, drugs, corruption etc): equitable access to/sharing of scarce resources: environmental protection and cooperation against accidents ……..

(c) Corresponding [non-CFSP] external policies: protection offered by CCP, EMU, common stand on WTO issues: policy on global environmental and climate change: multiple value of border controls and outgoing corrective policies on terrorism, drug, international crime, external pollution and environmental accidents, illegal migration and refugeeism; development aid policies and promotion of good government…..

(d) “Traditional” CFSP serving security at many levels: arms control and export controls (relevant to proliferation); EU support for wider peace-building processes (OSCE, sub-regional organisations); model for regional cooperation schemes outside Europe; mediation in crises in third regions - often more acceptable if EU has historical ties and/or is seen as less dominating or threatening than other actors……

(e) Crisis management proper: unique scope for application of multi-functional approach: diplomacy and mediation: political pressure: economic sticks and carrots: humanitarian aid: specialised functional support/advice: (can be coupled as necessary with inward-looking protective measures such as temporary border controls/collaboration on accommodation and return of refugees). Unlike NATO this range of instruments is particularly well adapted to crisis prevention and post-crisis reform and reconstruction.

It is this last area of activity which is designed to be supported - not replaced or denatured - by the addition of an option for direct EU c.m. action using military resources, in cases where NATO is not going to do the job and/or the job is not within NATO’s scope (eg a police operation). Instructive to think about why EU leaders found common will to take this radical step at present time. As pointed out above there was some historical logic to it as next step in building NATO’s European pillar: it also proved a powerful new goad for improving European defence spending and performance before post-CW slump hit point of no return. But in EU’s own terms it was an expression both of consciousness of strength, and of frustration:

- consciousness of holding so many other cards in c.m., and of maturing of EU’s global role notably through EMU;

- frustration that existing cards were being played so badly and Europe couldn’t even make a satisfactory diplomatic let alone military input to the two successive stages of the Kosovo crisis.

CESDP can thus be seen as an aspect of the same conscious power-gathering and institution-strengthening drive as creation of Solana’s post as CFSP High Representative, or reforms in Commission’s executive capacity. From one point of view it might seem to bring additional complications to the machinery and place additional, perhaps excessive burdens on the EU’s consensus-building capacity. But the record shows that the necessary institutions have been built with unprecedented speed: both the original Franco-British axis, and the EU’s general unity of purpose have held remarkably firm by usual standards, even in the face of several episodes of serious US scepticism. (The non-aligned States, interestingly, have been the least part of the problem.) Can therefore be seen (at least so far) as a successful “Fuite en avant”, an inner test of will which might indeed some day show the way to a successful external test of power.

EU Enlargement

Solana himself has also linked CESDP with the prospect of EU enlargement in the next 5 years: arguing that to protect its soon-growing territory the EU needs to become more effective not just in blocking non-military threats but in holding at bay crises which might overspill onto its territory or threaten its interests and resources. If we want to follow this line of thought, important to be very clear that the EU has not given and will not give anyone territorial guarantees. But the enlargement process clearly has security motives and effects: you only need to ask any of the last wave of entrants about the benefits they have gained in this respect. The present enlargement should have positive security impact at 3 main levels:

- pre-enlargement benefits through the effort made by candidate countries to solve old disputes with neighbours; to cooperate with them; and to strengthen domestic democracy, fair administration and free-market practices, all as part of strengthening their claims to admission

- benefits to the new members in all the ways listed above (now including automatic access to EU defence cooperation for crisis management purposes and a privileged status as part of the EU group interacting with NATO)

- benefits to the whole enlarged community from the ability to control a much larger territory and much wider borders against “new threats” from the outside, plus generally enhanced weight and prestige in the world (single market of half a billion, etc). Should far outweigh any challenges to individual interests eg from enhanced competition, labour migration, need for further reform of structural policies ……

Against this, must admit that the very effort to reach accession standards puts a heavy load on post-Communist societies and demands sacrifices which themselves could put internal security under strain. Special risk of backlash if entry hopes not satisfied in reasonable time. Hence Britain’s insistence - as one of strongest supporters of enlargement and strongest believers in its strategic rationale - on early progress and on a first wave of enlargement in time for the next European Parliament elections of 2004.

Final Thoughts

I hope this is enough to show that the Europeans have found a new and potentially very strong vehicle, in the EU, to protect their own security across an important part of the actual threat spectrum: from internal pacification through lower-level crises to the whole non-military range of internal and external risks. Of course even within this range there are rather few problems which the EU can aspire to solve entirely on its own. Challenges of global management demand US cooperation in the first place and secondly

that of still developing large powers like Russia and China - as the row over the Kyoto Protocol has recently reminded us. A range of specific crises from Europe’s borders to further afield may be partly solved by EU intervention but will need other players such as NATO, the UN or even individual nations to play more specific roles or take specific risks upon themselves. The growing strength and unity of the EU should be generally a good starting point for influencing other actors in such cases. But it will also need careful management so that it doesn’t alienate either the Americans, by seeming to challenge their leadership or break Atlantic solidarity - or the countries of other regions, by conveying post-colonial arrogance and seeming to threaten interference or manipulation. So far we have been very lucky that neither the power of the EU as such nor its plans for enlargement have been seen as a direct threat by Russia, and it’s very much in the interest of all Europeans to keep it that way. So the more cards there are in Europe’s hand, the more seriously and carefully they will have to be played.

You may have noticed that I still haven’t discussed responses to one particular strategic challenge to Europe: that from the South and South-East. That’s because there are no satisfactory or clear answers to it at present, nor can we even claim that any major institution is taking it seriously enough as yet. We can be pretty sure already that since we are facing something quite different here from traditional East-West confrontation, the answer will not be classic military deterrence or counter-attack, and that the institutional leadership is not likely to lie with NATO. We can already see a potential role for the EU inasmuch as the roots of insecurity are social, economic and to do with failings of democracy and tensions within States as much as between them. But the EU answer for those problems within Europe has been steadily to extend the bounds of its own enlargement policy, and it would be science fiction at present to think of extending that solution to Algeria, Palestine or even Azerbaijan.

Again, we can see that the problems of the Middle East and SW Asia are likely to be such as to engage both US and European interest: and that US and European instincts about to handle them will often be different, due not just to geographical distance but to the impact of the integration process itself on Europe’s mentality and modus operandi.  What we cannot yet see is how those differences can and will be reconciled so to ensure coherence of action by the democratic West, and to ensure that in this region too, Russia is given the opportunity to develop into a partner’s role without the excuse or provocation to exploit the situation against our interests.

It’s possible that when that set of problems really hits us it will bring challenges for the Europeans far beyond what we have experienced with Former Yugoslavia. What I do think (or hope) we can say with confidence is that the Europeans will be better able to defend their security interests in that next phase because of the larger consolidated territory they will be operating from, and the lessons that this phase has taught them. Historically, invaders from South and East have managed to drive deep into Europe only when Europe’s Empires of that time were already near to collapsing. The EU is the nearest thing Europe possesses to an Empire in these days: and far from crumbling, I believe we are now seeing it only at the beginning of its greatest strength. Could I remind you that Prime Minister Blair said in Warsaw last October that there would be “something truly bizarre and self -denying about [Britain] standing apart from the key strategic alliance on our doorstep? He was talking not about NATO, but the EU.

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